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Political Trust as the Basis for a Social Rights 
Enforcement Framework 
David Vitale* 
 
This article advances the claim that the concept of political trust offers a promising 
basis for a legal framework for enforcing social rights in contemporary social democracies. 
Specifically, the article offers three justifications for why we should use political trust as the 
basis for such a framework: an instrumental justification arising out of political trust’s value 
to contemporary social democracies; a theoretical justification stemming from the fiduciary 
nature of the citizen-government relationship; and a practical justification connected with the 
“two wrongs” of social rights enforcement. With those three justifications offered, the article 
then takes steps to conceptualize political trust in the specific context of social rights – a 
conceptualization which revolves around three expectations held by citizens with respect to 
government conduct: an expectation that government will exercise good will toward citizens; 
an expectation that government will fulfill its fiduciary responsibility to citizens; and an 
expectation of government competence. This conceptualization provides us with some insight 
into what a political trust-based framework for enforcing social rights would entail.  
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Introduction 
Social scientists have long explored the concept of trust. They have sought to define 
what trust is, to explain how it operates in contemporary societies and to understand its 
relationship with the critical end of cooperation. And owing in large part to the relationship 
between trust and cooperation, legal scholars – equipped with the body of literature yielded 
by such social scientific exploration – have, in turn, taken steps to use the concept of trust to 
better understand and advance their respective fields of law.1 This article draws inspiration 
                                               
1 Anthony J Bellia, Jr, “Promises, Trust, and Contract Law” (2002) 47 American Journal of Jurisprudence 25; 
Margaret M Blair and Lynn A Stout, “Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate 
Law” (2001) 149 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1735; Roger Cotterrell, “Trusting in Law: Legal and 
Moral Concepts of Trust” (1993) 46 Current Legal Problems 75; Frank B Cross, “Law and Trust” (2005) 93 
Georgetown Law Journal 1457; Mark A Hall, “Law, Medicine, and Trust” (2002) 55 Stanford Law Review 463; 
Mark A Hall, “The Importance of Trust for Ethics, Law, and Public Policy” (2005) 14 Cambridge Quarterly of 
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from that body of legal research. It seeks to employ trust – and specifically, the trust which 
citizens hold in government actors (what I broadly call “political trust”) – to contribute to a 
contentious area of legal scholarship: the judicial enforcement of constitutional social rights.2 
 There is presently a debate over how courts in contemporary social democracies can 
and should enforce constitutional social rights. 3  This debate forms part of a larger, 
longstanding conversation among scholars, politicians and jurists around social rights 
enforcement. In its “first wave”, the focus of the conversation was on the justiciability of 
social rights – that is, whether constitutional social rights are enforceable by courts.4 That 
wave reached its peak during the late 1980s to early 1990s when the new democracies of the 
Global South and the former-Soviet Union were deciding whether to include express (and 
enforceable) social rights provisions in their respective constitutions. The arguments against 
social rights’ justiciability fell into two principal categories: institutional legitimacy and 
institutional capacity. The argument from legitimacy posited that social rights matters, having 
significant budgetary consequences as well as the potential to shape what society looks like, 
are best left to the elected – and politically accountable – branches of government. Courts, 
being unelected, lack legitimacy to interfere with or second-guess those branches’ decisions 
or actions. The argument from capacity suggested that courts should not decide social rights 
                                                                                                                                                  
Healthcare Ethics 156; Matthew Harding, “Manifesting Trust” (2009) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 245; 
Matthew Harding, “Responding to Trust” (2011) 24 Ratio Juris 75; Matthew Harding, “Trust and Fiduciary 
Law” (2013) 33 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 81. 
2 The focus of this article is constitutional social rights: that is, those social rights which are protected under a 
national constitution – either expressly or implicitly (and read into the relevant constitution by a national court). 
3 When I refer to social rights “enforcement” in this article, I mean specifically enforcement by courts. 
4 I draw the language of “first wave” and “second wave” from Richard Stacey, “Dynamic Regulatory 
Constitutionalism: Taking Legislation Seriously in the Judicial Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights” 
(2017) 31 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 85 at 85-86. 
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matters since those matters raise polycentric problems which are not suitable for adjudication 
and because the courts lack the expertise and resources necessary to decide such matters.5 
However, after intense debate (including social rights scholars forcefully challenging 
the various assumptions underlying the arguments from legitimacy and capacity), many new 
democracies ultimately opted for the inclusion of social rights in their constitutions.6 
Moreover, in more established democracies, several courts have read social rights into their 
constitutions.7 And most scholars, jurists and politicians have now come to accept social 
rights’ justiciability, recognizing that the arguments from legitimacy and capacity do not 
support the conclusion that social rights are non-justiciable but, rather, that “caution is 
warranted” in their enforcement.8 So, following from this, the social rights enforcement 
                                               
5 For a summary of these arguments (although not in support of them), see Cécile Fabre, “Constitutionalising 
Social Rights” (1998) 6 The Journal of Political Philosophy 263 at 280-281; Sandra Fredman, Human Rights 
Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 93-96; Roberto 
Gargarella, “Deliberative Democracy, Dialogic Justice and the Promise of Social and Economic Rights” in 
Helena Alviar Garcia, Karl Klare and Lucy A Williams, eds, Social and Economic Rights in Theory and 
Practice: Critical Inquiries (New York: Routledge, 2015) at 107. 
6 In this regard, see the Toronto Initiative for Economic and Social Rights dataset which is available at 
http://www.tiescr.org/data.html. See also Courtney Jung, Ran Hirschl and Evan Rosevear, “Economic and 
Social Rights in National Constitutions” (2014) 62 American Journal of Comparative Law 1043. As Jung, 
Hirschl and Rosevear have noted, more than 90 per cent of these constitutions contain at least one social or 
economic right and 70 per cent contain at least one which is explicitly justiciable: at 1053. 
7 For example, see Germany (Hartz IV, BVerfG, Case No 1 BvL, 1/09, 125 BVerfGE 175); India (Olga Tellis & 
Ors v Bombay Municipal Corporation [1985] 2 Supp SCR 51); and Israel (Hassan v National Insurance 
Institute [2012] HCJ 10662/04). 
8 Jeff King, Judging Social Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 8; Colm O’Cinneide, 
“Legal Accountability and Social Justice” in Nicholas Bamforth and Peter Leyland, eds, Accountability in the 
Contemporary Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) at 401. 
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conversation (which is now in its “second wave”) is no longer focused on whether social 
rights are enforceable by courts, but, assuming they are, how courts should enforce them.9 
In recognition of the apparent shift in the social rights enforcement conversation, as 
well as in an effort to continue moving the conversation forward, I start my argument from 
the position that social rights are justiciable. Therefore, it is not my intention to contribute to 
the first wave (justiciability) debate – at least not directly.10 This is not to say that the 
arguments from legitimacy and capacity are without merit. But to repeat, those arguments do 
not warrant the conclusion that social rights are non-justiciable; they warrant caution in 
courts’ enforcement of those rights. This article thus seeks to contribute to the second wave 
debate; and consequently, it addresses the question of how courts should enforce social rights.  
Other commentators – in contribution to this second wave debate – have proposed an 
array of frameworks for social rights enforcement, rooting those frameworks in ideas which 
include inter-institutional dialogue,11 democratic experimentalism,12 deliberative democracy,13 
                                               
9 David Landau, “The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement” (2012) 53 Harvard International Law Journal 189 
at 196; Malcolm Langford, “The Justiciability of Social Rights: From Practice to Theory” in Malcolm Langford, 
ed, Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International Comparative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) at 29; Marius Pieterse, “Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-
Economic Rights” (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 383 at 404-405; Anashri Pillay, 
“Economic and Social Rights Adjudication: Developing Principles of Judicial Restraint in South Africa and the 
United Kingdom” [2013] Public Law 599 at 599. 
10 I say “not directly” because the argument which I advance in this article, by suggesting a means for courts to 
enforce social rights, also (albeit indirectly) offers a justification for those rights’ justiciability in the first place.  
11 Rosalind Dixon, “Creating Dialogue About Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form Versus Weak-Form Judicial 
Review Revisited” (2007) 5 International Journal of Constitutional Law 391. 
12 Alana Klein, “Judging as Nudging” (2008) 39 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 351. 
13 Fredman, supra note 5. 
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and judicial incrementalism.14 In this article, I argue that the concept of political trust, as it 
has been conceptualized in the social science literature, is of value to this debate. 
Specifically, I advance the claim that political trust offers a promising basis for a legal 
framework for enforcing social rights in contemporary social democracies.15 Put simply, I 
want to suggest that courts, in fulfilling their constitutional role as enforcers of social rights, 
should turn to the concept of political trust, employing it as a sort of adjudicative tool for 
defining governments’ enforceable obligations to citizens with respect to social rights.16  
Now, given the breadth of the political trust concept as well as the many complexities 
raised by social rights enforcement, this article cannot set out a comprehensive political trust-
based framework for enforcing social rights. And thus, that is not my aim in this article. My 
aim, rather, is to introduce the concept of political trust to the above social rights enforcement 
debate, justifying why the concept offers a promising basis for an enforcement framework as 
well as taking steps to conceptualize it in the context of this debate. Consequently, this article 
presents what may be considered the beginnings of such a political trust-based framework. 
I advance my claim in three parts. In Part I, I elaborate a bit upon what I mean by 
“political” trust. Then, in Part II, I offer three justifications for why political trust offers a 
promising basis for a social rights enforcement framework. They are: (a) the instrumental 
value of political trust to contemporary social democracies (an instrumental justification); (b) 
                                               
14 King, supra note 8. These frameworks have been proposed as alternatives to highly interventionist 
approaches, being arguably more democratically defensible than the latter given courts’ institutional limitations. 
15 It is well-recognized that social rights give rise to a tripartite set of duties on government: to respect (a duty of 
non-interference), to protect (a duty to prevent interference or denial by third parties) and to fulfill (a duty to 
positively provide). The latter duty is my primary concern as it raises the greatest issues of public resource 
allocation, thereby making it the main reason why social rights, and their enforcement, are controversial. 
16 As I note later in the article, I do not mean “citizens” in the sense of citizenship as legal status. Rather, I use 
the term to refer to that group of individuals who are afforded the constitutional protection of social rights. 
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drawing on the body of fiduciary political theory literature, the fiduciary nature of the 
relationship between citizens and their government with respect to social rights (a theoretical 
justification); and (c) the capacity of a political trust-based framework to strike an appropriate 
balance between what has been called the “two wrongs” of social rights enforcement – 
judicial usurpation and judicial abdication (a practical justification). And finally, having 
justified its value in this area, I take steps in Part III to conceptualize political trust in the 
specific context of social rights. My conceptualization in this regard provides us with some 
insight into what a political trust-based framework for enforcing social rights would entail. 
I. What Do I Mean by “Political” Trust? 
In the social science literature, trust has frequently been described as involving a 
three-part relationship between a trustee (A), a truster (B) and a good or service which the 
trustee controls and which the truster either needs or wants (X).17 That relationship takes the 
form of “B trusts A with respect to X”. As I noted earlier, by “political” trust I mean the trust 
which citizens hold in government actors.18 Accordingly, when I speak of political trust, A in 
                                               
17 For example, see Annette Baier, “Trust and Antitrust” (1985) 96 Ethics 231; Richard Holton, “Deciding to 
Trust, Coming to Believe” (1994) 72 Australian Journal of Philosophy 63; Russell Hardin, “Conceptions and 
Explanations of Trust” in Karen S Cook, ed, Trust in Society (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001). 
18 To be clear, I include in the term “government actors” individuals as well as institutions. In support of this 
conclusion, see Bernard Barber, The Logic and Limits of Trust (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
1983) at 18; Henry Farrell, “Institutions and Midlevel Explanations of Trust” in Karen S Cook, Margaret Levi 
and Russell Hardin, eds, Whom Can We Trust? How Groups, Networks, and Institutions Make Trust Possible 
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2009) at 133; Rom Harré, “Trust and its Surrogates” in Mark E Warren, 
ed, Democracy and Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) at 259-260; Jörg Sydow, 
“Understanding the Constitution of Interorganizational Trust” in Christel Lane and Reinhard Bachmann, eds, 
Trust Within and Between Organizations: Conceptual Issues and Empirical Applications (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998) at 43-44. 
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this three-part relationship refers to government, B refers to citizens and X refers to the many 
social goods and services at issue in social rights (ie those pertaining to health care, housing, 
education, etc) which governments control and which citizens need from government. For 
ease of reference, I call this three-part relationship the “citizen-government relationship”. 
In referring to government, I am referring specifically to the elected or representative 
branches of government (the “elected branches”).19 In there, I include the legislature and the 
executive (which, in turn, includes civil servants and the various administrative agencies 
relevant to social welfare).20 Next, when I refer to “citizens”, I do not mean it in the sense of 
citizenship as legal status. I use the term, rather, to denote those afforded the protection of 
constitutional social rights. Hence, depending on the jurisdiction, “citizens” may include 
residents and individuals of other legal status. And lastly, the social goods and services which 
X represents depend on the right at issue; but generally, X denotes physical goods, personnel, 
infrastructure, equipment, and benefits or services. The legislature exercises its control over 
those social goods and services by contributing amendments to and promulgating the primary 
legislation which defines the parameters of state-delivered social programs, as well as 
endorsing the budget which allows the state to fund (and deliver) programs; the executive 
                                               
19 I use “elected branches” and “elected branches of government” interchangeably. Also, I am assuming an 
unelected judiciary. And seeing as my aim is the development of a social rights enforcement framework, I 
exclude the judiciary from the term “government actors”. 
20 I have chosen to collapse the legislative and executive branches of government into a single trustee for two 
reasons. First, as I explained earlier, this article seeks to contribute to the current debate on the judicial 
enforcement of constitutional social rights. The orthodoxy in that literature is to focus on the tripartite 
relationship between citizens, the elected branches and the courts. Second, from a purely practical perspective, 
most of the literature on political trust which I am relying upon for my analysis here does not draw much of a 
distinction between the legislature and the executive. Rather, there is a tendency in that literature to speak of the 
relationship between citizens and their government at a more general level. Accordingly, I think that it is best 
for me to maintain my analysis at an equally general level. 
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exercises its control by preparing the bulk of primary legislation introduced to the legislature, 
and then, by supplementing, amplifying and implementing that legislation through a range of 
administrative action.21 These legislative and administrative steps are prerequisites to the 
state-delivered social programs which grant citizens access to the social goods and services. 
Further, because social rights are said to promise social goods and services which citizens 
need in order to lead a decent life, I am assuming that in the citizen-government relationship, 
the social goods and services at issue are not merely wanted – but needed – by citizens.22 
II. Justifying Political Trust as the Basis for an Enforcement Framework 
A. An Instrumental Justification 
The first justification which I put forward for why political trust offers a promising 
basis for a social rights enforcement framework parallels the principal reason why scholars in 
other fields of law have turned to trust in their scholarship: the relationship between trust and 
cooperation. In the political context generally, when citizens have trust in government actors, 
they are more likely to regard government actions as legitimate and to cooperate with those 
actors, tolerating the political regime and voluntarily complying with laws and government 
demands.23 Such cooperation is critical because it allows the state to focus its limited 
                                               
21 King, supra note 8 at 41-48; Lorne Sossin, “Boldly Going Where No Law Has Gone Before: Call Centres, 
Intake Scripts, Database Fields, and Discretionary Justice in Social Assistance” (2004) 42 Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 363 at 364-365. 
22 Cécile Fabre, Social Rights Under the Constitution: Government and the Decent Life (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003) at 7; King, ibid at 17. 
23 Russell J Dalton, Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced 
Industrial Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Sofie Marien and Marc Hooghe, “Does 
Political Trust Matter? An Empirical Investigation into the Relation Between Political Trust and Support for 
Compliance” (2011) 50 European Journal of Political Research 267; Pippa Norris, “Conclusion: The Growth of 
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resources for coercion on the relatively few disobedient citizens.24 As Russell Dalton has 
explained, “democracy functions with minimal coercive force because of the legitimacy of 
the system and the voluntary compliance of the public. Declining feelings of political trust … 
can undermine this relationship and thus the workings of democracy”.25 And therefore, as 
citizens’ voluntary compliance with laws and government demands becomes the norm for a 
democracy, citizen cooperation translates into an overall system of social stability.26 
 In the social rights context, this relationship has two ramifications which make 
political trust of the utmost importance. First, because of that relationship, political trust is 
imperative to the financing of state-delivered social programs.27 State-provided social goods 
and services depend on resources which citizens provide in the form of taxes. Using the 
revenue collected from those taxes, the state is able to provide said goods and services by 
delivering social programs. Consequently, taxes operate as “the economic glue of social 
programs, the source of government’s ability to transfer resources – and, indeed, to function 
                                                                                                                                                  
Critical Citizens and Its Consequences” in Pippa Norris, ed, Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic 
Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
24 Russell Hardin, “Trust in Government” in Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi, eds, Trust and Governance 
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998) at 10. 
25 Dalton, supra note 23 at 159. 
26 ibid at 165. 
27 Joseph S Nye, Jr, “Introduction: The Decline of Confidence in Government” in Joseph S Nye, Jr, Philip D 
Zelikow and David C King, eds, Why People Don’t Trust Government (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1997); Bo Rothstein, Marcus Samanni and Jan Teorell, “Explaining the Welfare State: Power Resources vs. the 
Quality of Government” (2012) 4 European Political Science Review 1; Stefan Svallfors, “Introduction” in 
Stefan Svallfors, ed, The Political Sociology of the Welfare State: Institutions, Social Cleavages and 
Orientations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). 
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at all”.28 And following from this fact, we can fairly conclude that the “future of the welfare 
state is likely to hinge on the ability for nation states to levy taxes … on their populations”.29 
But citizens’ compliance with tax laws (a form of cooperation) depends on their trust 
in government.30 Put simply, citizens who do not trust their government are less likely to pay 
their taxes. Research by John Scholz and Mark Lubell offers empirical support for this 
conclusion.31 In an analysis of U.S. Internal Revenue Service survey data (combined with in-
person interviews), they found that trust in government significantly increased the likelihood 
of respondents’ tax compliance. This relationship persisted even after controlling for the 
influence of self-interested fear of getting caught and an internalized sense of duty. Scholz 
and Lubell concluded that “trust in government … significantly influence[s] tax 
compliance”.32 Further, Steven Sheffrin and Robert Triest, in a study analyzing the same 
survey data as Scholz and Lubell, found that respondents’ attitudes towards government 
(including a belief that tax money is wasted by government) was the best predictor of 
                                               
28 Eric M Uslaner, “Tax Evasion, Trust, and the Strong Arm of the Law” in Nicolas Hayoz and Simon Hug, eds, 
Tax Evasion, Trust and State Capacities (Bern: Peter Lang, 2007) at 19. 
29 Nathalie Morel and Joakim Palme, “Financing the Welfare State and the Politics of Taxation” in Brent Greve, 
ed, The Routledge Handbook of the Welfare State (New York: Routledge, 2013) at 407. 
30 For a general summary, see Norris, supra note 23; Nye, Jr, supra note 27. 
31 John T Scholz and Mark Lubell, “Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic Approach to Collective Action” 
(1998) 42 American Journal of Political Science 398. See also John T Scholz, “Trust, Taxes, and Compliance” 
in Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi, eds, Trust and Governance (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
1998); John T Scholz and Neil Pinney, “Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citizenship 
Behavior” (1995) 39 American Journal of Political Science 490. 
32 Scholz and Lubell, ibid at 412. 
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underreporting income and overstating deductions.33  Such attitudes were even a better 
predictor than the probability of detection and whether fellow citizens paid their fair share.34 
Second, and relatedly, political trust has bearing on whether citizens support social 
policies (including whether they agree to public resources being put toward those policies and 
whether they agree to tax increases in support of those policies). In this regard, political trust 
functions as a cognitive heuristic which citizens rely upon when forming opinions about 
social policies.35 Faced with the complex institutional arrangements of the welfare state and 
the uncertain consequences of social policies, citizens turn to trust: “Other things equal, if 
people perceive the architect of policies as untrustworthy, they will reject its policies; if they 
consider it trustworthy, they will be more inclined to embrace them”.36 The more citizens 
assess their government to be trustworthy, the more likely they are to grant it “contingent 
consent”.37 That is, they are more likely to support a social policy (or at least to tolerate it) 
even if they perceive the likely outcome of that policy to be unfavourable for them.38 And 
such consent includes agreeing with public resources being put toward those policies and to 
                                               
33 Steven M Sheffrin and Robert K Triest, “Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in 
Taxpayer Compliance” in Joel Slemrod, ed, Why People Pay Taxes (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1992). 
34 For further support, see Dalton, supra note 23 at 158-159; Margaret Levi and Audrey Sacks, “Legitimating 
Beliefs: Sources and Indicators” (2009) 3 Regulation & Governance 311; Kristina Murphy, “The Role of Trust 
in Nurturing Compliance: A Study of Accused Tax Avoiders” (2004) 28 Law and Human Behavior 187. 
35 Marc J Hetherington, Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Thomas J Rudolph, “Political Trust, Ideology, and Public 
Support for Tax Cuts” (2009) 73 Public Opinion Quarterly 144 at 144-145. 
36 Hetherington, ibid at 51. 
37 Margaret Levi, Consent, Dissent and Patriotism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
38 Oscar W Gabriel and Eva-Maria Trüdinger, “Embellishing Welfare State Reforms? Political Trust and the 
Support for Welfare State Reforms in Germany” (2011) 20 German Politics 273 at 275. 
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tax increases in support of them. Hence, aside from trust’s relevance as an influence on 
citizens’ provision of critical resources in the form of tax money, trust is also – as a heuristic 
linked to citizen support for social policies – in itself “a critical resource for government”.39 
Again, there is a body of empirical research to back the claim that political trust 
affects citizens’ support for social policies. Virginia Chanley and her colleagues have offered 
convincing evidence on this front. 40  Specifically, using U.S. survey data, their study 
examined the relationship between public trust in government and what they refer to as 
“policy mood” (a measure reflecting “the extent of public support for increased government 
spending and activity across a range of domestic policy areas, including education, health 
care, welfare, aid to cities, and the environment”).41 They found a positive correlation: greater 
trust in government correlated with greater policy mood. Chanley and her colleagues 
concluded that their findings were “consistent with theoretical expectations concerning the 
importance of trust in government for public willingness to commit public resources for 
policy ends”.42 A study conducted by Stefan Svallfors using Swedish survey data yielded 
similar findings to those of Chanley and her colleagues.43 In fact, Sven Steinmo – in his 
comparative work on welfare states – has persuasively argued that the difference in the size 
                                               
39 Eva-Maria Trüdinger and Uwe Bollow, “Evaluations of Welfare State Reforms in Germany: Political Trust 
Makes a (Big) Difference” in Sonja Zmerli and Marc Hooghe, eds, Political Trust: Why Context Matters 
(Colchester: ECPR Press, 2011) at 189. 
40 Virginia A Chanley, Thomas J Rudolph and Wendy M Rahn, “The Origins and Consequences of Public Trust 
in Government” (2000) 64 Public Opinion Quarterly 239. 
41 ibid at 245. 
42 ibid at 253. 
43 Stefan Svallfors, “Political Trust and Support for the Welfare State: Unpacking a Supposed Relationship” in 
Bo Rothstein and Sven Steinmo, eds, Restructuring the Welfare State: Political Institutions and Policy Change 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002). 
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of the welfare state in Sweden as compared with that of the United States is attributable to a 
difference in political trust (rather than a difference in citizen want for government spending, 
as is usually presumed).44 In interviews which he conducted with citizens of Sweden, Britain 
and the United States, Steinmo found that the vast majority – including Americans – said that 
they would agree to an increase in their taxes if they “could be guaranteed that increased 
government spending would be efficiently and effectively used to address society’s 
problems”.45 He found, however, that American respondents were especially likely to follow 
up their response by saying that they did “not believe that revenue from higher taxes would 
be used efficiently or effectively and therefore they would not approve tax increases”.46 
The tax compliance and social policy support which follow from political trust are 
especially important given present circumstances which make the public funding and delivery 
of social goods and services ever-more challenging. In 2001, Paul Pierson wrote that the 
welfare state in affluent democracies faces a context of “permanent austerity”.47 By this he 
meant that owing to a set of circumstances which have generated much fiscal stress for 
countries (including changes in the global economy, a slowdown in economic growth, aging 
populations and reduced fertility rates), it is increasingly difficult for governments to finance 
                                               
44 Sven Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British and American Approaches to Financing the 
Modern State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). See also Sven H Steinmo, “American Exceptionalism 
Reconsidered: Culture or Institutions?” in Lawrence C Dodd and Calvin Jillson, eds, The Dynamics of American 
Politics: Approaches and Interpretations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994). 
45 Steinmo (1993), ibid at 199. 
46 ibid at 199. For further empirical support see Eun Young Nam and Myungsook Woo, “Who is Willing to Pay 
More Taxes for Welfare? Focusing on the Effects of Diverse Types of Trust in South Korea and Taiwan” (2015) 
44 Development and Society 319; Trüdinger and Bollow, supra note 39. 
47 Paul Pierson, “Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent Democracies” in 
Paul Pierson, ed, The New Politics of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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previously-made commitments to social goods and services. Contrary to then-popular beliefs, 
Pierson prophesied that given persistent citizen support for the welfare state, the consequence 
of these pressures would not be the entire dismantling of the welfare state, but moderate cost-
cutting efforts by governments. According to Pierson, “neither the alternatives of standing pat 
or dismantling are likely to prove viable in most countries”.48 Instead, “we should expect 
strong pressures to move towards more centrist – and therefore more incremental – 
responses. Those seeking to generate significant cost reductions while modernizing particular 
aspects of social provision will generally hold the balance of political power”.49 
Over the past 15 years, we have witnessed these sorts of cost-cutting efforts in 
affluent and developing democracies alike.50 And the 2008 Global Financial Crisis has not 
helped.51 While the period immediately after the crisis saw most countries increase public 
spending (by introducing fiscal stimulus programs), by 2010, that trend reversed itself and 
premature budget cuts – as “austerity” measures – became widespread.52 A review of 
austerity trends in 187 countries between 2010-2020 found that by 2011, the majority of 
                                               
48 ibid at 417. 
49 ibid at 417. 
50 James Connelly, “Conclusion: Remaining the Welfare State?” in James Connelly and Jack Hayward, eds, The 
Withering of the Welfare State: Regression (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Staffan Kumlin, 
“Overloaded or Undermined? European Welfare States in the Face of Performance Dissatisfaction” in Stefan 
Svallfors, ed, The Political Sociology of the Welfare State: Institutions, Social Cleavages, and Orientations 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). 
51 Aoife Nolan, “Introduction” in Aoife Nolan, ed, Economic and Social Rights After the Global Financial 
Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 1-4. 
52 Isabel Ortiz et al, “The Decade of Adjustment: A Review of Austerity Trends 2010-2020 in 187 Countries” 
(International Labour Organization, ESS Working Paper No 53, 2015) at http://www.social-
protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourcePDF.action?ressource.ressourceId=53192 (last accessed 11 August 2017) at 
9. See also ibid at 3. 
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sampled countries reduced their budgets, with an average reduction of 2.3 per cent of GDP.53 
It was projected that this contraction in public spending would intensify at least into 2020. 
And such contraction is not limited to affluent democracies; on the contrary, public spending 
contraction has been, and is projected to be, most severe in developing democracies.54 
Given the current state of events, it may be that now – more than ever – governments 
need their citizens to pay taxes and to support their social policies. If not, these two factors, 
coupled with the effects of the Global Financial Crisis and the circumstances which have 
given rise to “permanent austerity”, will seriously endanger governments’ ability to provide 
social goods and services. To be blunt, without such taxes and support, there likely will be no 
such goods and services; and so, political trust may be critical to the future of social rights.55 
Before moving onto my second justification, I will make one point of clarification. 
Many writers on trust have emphasized that political trust is not always a good thing. It can, 
in some cases, be detrimental to democracy.56 These writers have suggested that, in such 
cases, distrust or scepticism from citizens is beneficial because it “keeps constituents alert, 
                                               
53 Ortiz et al, ibid at 2. 
54 ibid at 53. 
55 With that said, a word of caution is warranted: political trust also presents a danger (given its connection to 
public support for policies). That danger is that citizens will support regressive policies. In this regard, see 
Trüdinger and Bollow, supra note 39. In light of this danger, if we do employ trust as the basis for a social 
rights enforcement framework (as I am suggesting), we will also need to introduce some degree of caution. 
56 Karen S Cook, Russell Hardin and Margaret Levi, Cooperation Without Trust? (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 2005) at 165; Margaret Levi, “A State of Trust” in Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi, eds, 
Trust and Governance (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998) at 95-96; Mark Warren, “Trust and 
Democracy” in Eric M Uslaner, ed, The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018) at 81; Mark E Warren, “What Kinds of Trust Does a Democracy Need? Trust from the 
Perspective of Democratic Theory” in Sonja Zmerli and Tom WG van der Meer, eds, Handbook on Political 
Trust (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017) at 35.  
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and therefore public officials responsive”.57 It has thus been said that “healthy skepticism of 
citizens is a prerequisite of democracy”.58 I do not dispute this argument. But in my view, the 
cases about which these writers are concerned are where government shows itself to not be 
worthy of citizens’ trust. Where government shows itself to be untrustworthy, of course 
citizens should not blindly or indiscriminately trust; they should be sceptical. And in such 
cases, more trust should not be our aim.59 However, as I will explain shortly, a political trust-
based framework for enforcing social rights would seek to create conditions which foster 
citizens’ trust in the elected branches with respect to social rights (rather than seek to increase 
such trust without any foundation for it).60 As such, its focus would be on what we may call 
“warranted” political trust.61 And such trust, it has been argued, is beneficial for democracy.62 
                                               
57 Cook, Hardin and Levi, ibid at 165. 
58 Levi, supra note 56 at 96. 
59 As Onora O’Neill has put it, “it is foolish to assume that we should always, or indeed generally, seek to 
‘restore trust’ or to ‘build more trust’. Where we have to deal with untrustworthy persons or institutions it would 
be a bad idea to aim for more trust”: “Accountable Institutions, Trustworthy Cultures” (2017) 9 Hague Journal 
on the Rule of Law 401 at 406.  
60 Cook, Hardin and Levi, supra note 56; Onora O’Neill, A Question of Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
61 Mark E Warren, “Introduction” in Mark E Warren, ed, Democracy and Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999) at 4; Mark E Warren, “Democratic Theory and Trust” in Mark E Warren, ed, 
Democracy and Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Relatedly, O’Neill has suggested that 
what we need in public life is an “intelligent conception of trust” – that is, trust which is “well placed”: Onora 
O’Neill, “Trust, Trustworthiness, and Accountability” in Nicholas Morris and David Vines, eds, Capital 
Failure: Rebuilding Trust in Financial Services (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) at 178. 
62 Warren (2017), supra note 56; Warren (2018), supra note 56. 
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B. A Theoretical Justification 
My second justification for why political trust offers a promising basis for a social 
rights enforcement framework is theoretical in character. And it stems from the nature of the 
citizen-government relationship. Specifically, I argue that the citizen-government relationship 
may be fairly characterized as a fiduciary relationship. And it follows from that, based on a 
line of reasoning advanced in the private law fiduciary literature, that the objective of social 
rights enforcement should be to facilitate citizen trust in the citizen-government relationship. 
First of all, in making the claim that the citizen-government relationship is a fiduciary 
relationship, I rely in substantial part upon an important body of work developed by public 
law scholars in the last 15 years or so which has emphasized the fiduciary foundations of 
public authority – a body broadly described as “fiduciary political theory”.63 Scholars in this 
camp have argued that various relationships in the political realm (including those between 
political representatives and the people, judges and the people, and administrative agencies 
and the people) are fairly characterized as fiduciary in nature. Here, I make a similar 
suggestion in the social rights context with respect to the citizen-government relationship.64 
                                               
63 As a representative sample, see Evan J Criddle, “Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law” (2006) 54 
UCLA Law Review 117; Evan Fox-Decent, “The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority” (2005) 31 Queen’s 
Law Journal 259; Evan Fox-Decent, Sovereignty’s Promise: The State as Fiduciary (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011); Ethan J Leib, David L Ponet and Michael Serota, “A Fiduciary Theory of Judging” (2013) 101 
California Law Review 699; D Theodore Rave, “Politicians as Fiduciaries (2013) 126 Harvard Law Review 
671. The terminology of “fiduciary political theory” was coined by Ethan J Leib, David L Ponet and Michael 
Serota, “Translating Fiduciary Principles into Public Law” (2013) 126 Harvard Law Review Forum 91. 
64 It is beyond the scope of this article, however, to argue this point fully (ie with reference to the legal 
framework in a particular jurisdiction (as the above scholars have done in their respective works)). Moreover, I 
recognize that fiduciary political theory has its critics: see Seth Davis, “The False Promise of Fiduciary 
Government” (2014) 89 Notre Dame Law Review 1145; Timothy Endicott, “Equity and Administrative 
Behaviour: A Commentary” in Equity and Administration (2016); Ethan J Leib and Stephen R Galoob, 
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To support my suggestion, I will employ Evan Fox-Decent’s conceptualization of a 
fiduciary relationship (developed to advance his claim that the state-subject relationship is 
fiduciary in nature).65 For him, three conditions are necessary and sufficient for a fiduciary 
relationship to arise: (i) the fiduciary must have “administrative”, discretionary power over 
some set of the beneficiary’s interests; (ii) the beneficiary must be “incapable of controlling 
the fiduciary’s exercise of power”; and (iii) the beneficiary’s relevant interests must be 
“capable of forming the subject matter of a fiduciary obligation”.66 I will now consider each. 
 Fox-Decent’s first condition has two sub-conditions: (a) the fiduciary must exercise 
discretionary power over a set of the beneficiary’s interests; and (b) that power must be  
“administrative” in nature – ie it must be “institutional” (the exercise of power takes place in 
an institution which has its own substantive values and internal practices), “purpose-laden” 
                                                                                                                                                  
“Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique” (2016) 125 The Yale Law Journal 1820. That said, for the reasons 
which scholars in this camp have put forward, I think that fiduciary political theory holds significant promise 
and I suggest that it can be applied to the citizen-government relationship: for a response to the above critiques, 
see Evan Fox-Decent, “Challenges to Public Fiduciary Theory: An Assessment” in D Gordon Smith and 
Andrew S Gold, eds, Research Handbook on Fiduciary Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2018). 
65 There is a difference of opinion in the literature as to what characterizes a fiduciary relationship. I employ 
Fox-Decent’s conceptualization because there is significant overlap between his conceptualization and those of 
others, it is rooted in case law, and his work has been highly influential in the fiduciary political theory field. 
66 Fox-Decent (2011), supra note 63 at 93-94. These three conditions are consistent with what Leib, Ponet and 
Serota have identified as the three indicia of fiduciary relationships: discretion, vulnerability and trust: supra 
note 63 at 706. For additional support for my suggestion, see the work of Laura Underkuffler who has used 
fiduciary political theory to ground positive social rights: Laura S Underkuffler, “Property, Sovereignty, and the 
Public Trust” (2017) 18 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 329; Laura S Underkuffler, “Fiduciary Theory: The 
Missing Piece for Positive Rights” in Evan Criddle et al, eds, Fiduciary Government (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, forthcoming 2018). In doing so, Underkuffler characterizes the citizen-government 
relationship as fiduciary in nature (though she does so using a broader idea of that relationship than I do). 
 
20 
(the power is exercised for some purpose) and “other-regarding” (that purpose involves a 
party other than the fiduciary).67 Both sub-conditions are satisfied in the citizen-government 
relationship. As for (a), it will be recalled that the social goods and services at issue in social 
rights are things which citizens need; and as such, citizens have an interest in obtaining them. 
Also recall that the elected branches exercise control over those social goods and services 
through the legislative and administrative steps outlined earlier (ie the preparation, 
development and promulgation of primary legislation, the preparation and approval of the 
budget, and subsequent administrative action). Because in each of those steps, the elected 
branches exercise significant discretion, it is fair to say that the elected branches exercise 
discretionary power over a set of citizens’ interests (ie vis-à-vis those goods and services).68 
With respect to (b), I submit that the elected branches’ discretionary power in this 
regard is “administrative” in nature. Its institutional character is obvious. As for its being 
purpose-laden and other-regarding, it satisfies these elements for two reasons. The first is the 
overarching fact of sovereignty (which Fox-Decent has used to argue that the state’s power 
over its subjects is purpose-laden and other-regarding).69 According to Fox-Decent, because 
the state assumes sovereign powers (which it exercises through its institutions), subjects have 
no choice but to “entrust the specification, administration, adjudication, and vindication of 
                                               
67 Fox-Decent, ibid at 101. 
68 Robert E Goodin, “Welfare, Rights and Discretion” (1986) 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 232; Robert E 
Goodin, Reasons for Welfare: The Political Theory of the Welfare State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1988); Sossin, supra note 21; Richard M Titmuss, “Welfare ‘Rights’, Law and Discretion” (1971) 42 The 
Political Quarterly 113. 
69 Fox-Decent (2011), supra note 63 at 29. Owing to this overarching fact of sovereignty, Fox-Decent has 
recognized that “with respect to the legislative, executive and judicial powers entailed by sovereignty, they each 
in their own familiar ways are institutional, purpose-laden, and other-regarding”: at 112. 
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their rights to the state”.70 And for that reason, Fox-Decent has argued, the state exercises its 
sovereign powers for the purpose of benefiting its subjects. Included in those rights are social 
rights whose administration and specification citizens have no choice but to entrust to the 
state (and by extension, the elected branches which exercise its powers). Thus, I think that 
Fox-Decent’s argument may be fairly extended to the citizen-government relationship. 
Second, there is a good argument that citizens, via their payment of taxes, specifically entrust 
social goods and services to the state (and again by extension, to the elected branches).71 Both 
of the above points – the fact of sovereignty and citizens’ specific entrustment of social goods 
and services to the elected branches via their payment of taxes – support the same conclusion: 
that the elected branches’ discretionary power over citizens’ interests vis-à-vis the relevant 
social goods and services is exercised for the purpose of benefiting citizens. And owing to 
that conclusion, their power may be characterized as both purpose-laden and other-regarding. 
 The second condition of a fiduciary relationship is that the beneficiary is incapable of 
controlling the fiduciary’s exercise of power – and following from that fact, the beneficiary is 
vulnerable to abuses of the fiduciary’s power.72 This condition is also satisfied in the citizen-
government relationship. As Fox-Decent has argued for the state-subject relationship, 
“[p]rivate parties have no authority to … exercise the powers necessary to determine” their 
rights: “they do not get to make laws that apply to others” and so, “are juridically incapable 
of exercising public authority”.73 This argument applies no less to the citizen-government 
relationship. Aside from their limited voting power, citizens are incapable of controlling the 
                                               
70 ibid at 111. 
71 In this regard, see Charles A Reich, “The New Property” (1964) 73 The Yale Law Journal 733; John Allett, 
“New Liberalism & the New Property Doctrine: Welfare Rights as Property Rights” (1987) 20 Polity 57. 
72 Fox-Decent (2011), supra note 63 at 101. 
73 ibid at 111. 
 
22 
elected branches’ power over their interests vis-à-vis social goods and services. They do not 
dictate the content of social welfare legislation, they do not decide what is and is not included 
in the budget and they do not control the administrative action through which the legislation 
is implemented. As a result, citizens are vulnerable to abuses of the elected branches’ power. 
 Finally, the beneficiary’s interests must be “capable of forming the subject matter of a 
fiduciary obligation”.74 The fiduciary relationship has trust at its core.75 As Fox-Decent has 
explained, the fiduciary concept was “born of a rich and complex legal history animated by a 
concern to protect the integrity of relations of trust”.76 But for Fox-Decent, in contrast to how 
the social science literature has conceptualized it, trust is a presumptive concept: that is, the 
fiduciary exercises his power “on the basis of the beneficiary’s trust” regardless of whether 
the beneficiary does anything to repose trust in him.77 Thus, Fox-Decent has argued that in 
the state-subject relationship, trust is both the basis for the state’s authority over its subjects 
and its duty to them. As he has summarized, the law, via the fiduciary principle, “entrusts the 
state to establish legal order on behalf of the people”; and the state, in turn, “exercises power 
on the basis of the people’s trust … precisely because the fiduciary principle has entrusted the 
state with public powers on their behalf”.78 The same reasoning may be applied to the citizen-
government relationship. Regardless of citizens’ actual trust in the elected branches with 
respect to social rights, the fiduciary principle entrusts them with the above power on 
citizens’ behalf; and the elected branches exercise their power on the basis of citizens’ trust. 
The citizen-government relationship thus satisfies the fiduciary relationship’s third condition. 
                                               
74 ibid at 93-94. 
75 Leib, Ponet and Serota, supra note 63 identify trust as the third indicium of a fiduciary relationship. 
76 Fox-Decent (2011), supra note 63 at 30. 
77 ibid at 105. 
78 ibid at 106. 
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Now, in the private law context, fiduciary law scholars have argued, perhaps not so 
surprisingly, that the law regulating the relationship between fiduciaries and their principals 
should centre on trust.79 Seeing as fiduciary relationships have trust at their core, fiduciary 
law, in essence, “regulates relationships that are based on reasonable trust”.80 And thus, so 
the argument goes, it makes sense that fiduciary law should centre on trust. In the most recent 
and clearest example of this argument, Matthew Harding has claimed that given the centrality 
of trust to the fiduciary relationship, fiduciary law ought to be aimed at facilitating trusting 
relationships between fiduciaries and principals. In his words, “a main purpose of fiduciary 
law [ought to be] to enable such relationships to form, persist and deepen in ways that 
generate the instrumental … value” of such relationships.81 For Harding, fiduciary law can 
achieve this purpose by providing principals with “guarantees that the conduct of the 
fiduciaries will be consistent with the requirements of trustworthiness”.82 In other words, 
owing to fiduciary law, a principal in a fiduciary relationship can expect the fiduciary to act 
trustworthily and so, can trust him with respect to the property or power in their relationship. 
 If we apply the above reasoning to the citizen-government relationship, it follows that 
social rights enforcement should centre on political trust. Why? Given that social rights 
enforcement is the means by which courts oversee the citizen-government relationship, its 
governing law (social rights law) regulates that relationship. And based on the above 
reasoning – that the law regulating fiduciary relationships should centre on trust – it follows 
                                               
79 Tamar Frankel, “Fiduciary Law” (1983) 71 California Law Review 795; Joshua Getzler, “‘As If.’ 
Accountability and Counterfactual Trust” (2011) 91 Boston University Law Review 973; Harding (2013), supra 
note 1. 
80 Tamar Frankel, “Fiduciary Law in the Twenty-First Century” (2011) 91 Boston University Law Review 1289 
at 1291. 
81 Harding (2013), supra note 1 at 97. 
82 ibid at 95. 
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that social rights law – as law regulating a fiduciary relationship (the citizen-government 
relationship) – should centre on political trust. Simply, social rights law should be aimed at 
facilitating trust between citizens and the elected branches with respect to social rights so as 
to “generate the instrumental … value” of citizen trust in the citizen-government relationship. 
Granted, I recognize the dangers of extending private law principles to a public law 
context (given their differences both in purpose and application).83 But I should point out that 
in characterizing the citizen-government relationship as a fiduciary relationship, I do not 
adopt a “literalist” approach to public fiduciary theorizing.84 That is, I am not suggesting that 
the elected branches’ duties to citizens are literally identical to those of a trustee in the private 
law context.85 And in arguing that social rights enforcement should centre on political trust, I 
am not advocating transplantation of private law doctrine to public law. I am suggesting, 
rather, as Fox-Decent has phrased it, that “the principles relevant to acting on behalf of 
another in private law might help illuminate” this public law context.86 Thus, to be sure, we 
need to exercise “caution when considering the application of fiduciary concepts to public 
law” (and fiduciary duties in a public law context will assume a different form).87 But I do 
                                               
83 Davis, supra note 64 at 1198-1206; Endicott, supra note 64 at 375. For example, Timothy Endicott has noted 
that in the administrative law context, the role of the fiduciary is “deeply different” from the role of 
administrative agencies in general and the role of judges in enforcing the fiduciary duties of trustees is different 
from their role in reviewing the lawfulness of administrative decision-making: at 375. 
84 Fox-Decent, supra note 64. The “literalist” terminology has been used by Stephen R Galoob and Ethan J 
Leib, “The Core of Fiduciary Political Theory” in D Gordon Smith and Andrew S Gold, eds, Research 
Handbook on Fiduciary Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2018). 
85 I am thus not making an argument like that which the Supreme Court of Canada considered (and rejected) in 
Alberta v Elder Advocates of Alberta Society, 2011 SCC 24. 
86 Fox-Decent, supra note 64 at 382 (fn 21). 
87 ibid at 400. 
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think that the above broad reasoning can be justifiably extended to the social rights context in 
light of the fact that the fiduciary political theory literature has, like the private law literature, 
recognized trust’s centrality to fiduciary relationships. For example, recall that for Fox-
Decent, trust is the basis for the state’s authority over its subjects as well as its duty to them: 
their trust authorizes the state to act on their behalf and, in turn, the state must act on basis of 
that trust. Given that literature’s recognition of the key role trust plays in fiduciary 
relationships, I do not think that the above reasoning is misplaced in the social rights context. 
Further, my suggestion in this regard finds support in an argument which Paul Finn 
has made. Finn – who may be included in the camp of fiduciary political theory scholars – 
has argued that we may fairly characterize government as a trust (and so, characterize 
government actors as trustees for the people).88 To support his argument, Finn has advanced 
three propositions: (i) that sovereign power resides in the people; (ii) that where the public’s 
power is entrusted to others for the purposes of civil governance, the relevant actors are 
trustees for the people; and (iii) that those “entrusted with public power are accountable to the 
public for the exercise of their trust”.89 As part of his argument, and importantly for my 
purpose, Finn has contended that the people – in virtue of their sovereignty – are entitled to 
have certain expectations about the manner of their governing. And such expectations may 
ground corresponding duties on government actors. One key expectation is what Finn has 
called the “integrity principle”. It necessitates that “government is structured and practised in 
ways that invite and retain public trust in government itself”.90 In other words, the people are 
                                               
88 Paul Finn, “Public Trust and Public Accountability” (1994) 3 Griffith Law Review 224; Paul Finn, “A 
Sovereign People, A Public Trust” in PD Finn, ed, Essays on Law and Government, Volume 1: Principles and 
Values (Melbourne: The Law Book Company, 1995).  
89 Finn (1994), ibid at 227-228. 
90 Finn (1995), supra note 88 at 27. 
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entitled to expect that government actors – as trustees for the people – will exercise public 
power in a trustworthy manner; and government actors may have a corresponding duty to 
exercise the power which has been entrusted to them trustworthily.91 Hence, in light of Finn’s 
work in this regard, there is precedent in the public law literature for the idea that political 
trust can and should be used as the basis for a government’s obligations to its citizens. 
C. A Practical Justification 
The final justification which I put forward for why political trust offers a promising 
basis for a social rights enforcement framework is of a practical nature. In their enforcement 
of constitutional social rights, there are two errors or “wrongs” which courts can make.92 The 
first is “judicial abdication” and it “occurs when the judiciary declines to protect 
constitutional rights”, thereby abdicating its role as protector and enforcer of constitutional 
rights.93 For example, a court abdicates its role in this regard where it shows too much 
deference to the elected branches in enforcing social rights. 94  The second, “judicial 
usurpation”, “occurs when the judiciary interprets and applies [social] rights in such a manner 
                                               
91 In recent work, Finn has suggested that “we should be slow to embrace” such trust/fiduciary principles “so as 
to channel and control official decision making” (including judicial review), in large part owing to the fact that, 
in Finn’s view, they are unlikely to “provide workable criteria upon which to found judicial review of official 
decision making”: Paul Finn, “Public Trusts, Public Fiduciaries” (2010) 38 Federal Law Review 335 at 335-
335. However, I disagree with Finn in this regard; I suggest that my conceptualization of trust in this article does 
provide – at least the beginnings of – such workable criteria. 
92 Katharine Young, Constituting Economic and Social Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 134. 
93 ibid at 134. 
94 Matthias Klatt, “Positive Rights: Who Decides? Judicial Review in Balance” (2015) 13 International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 354 at 361. 
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that it assumes control of the political system … crowding out … the democratically elected 
branches”.95 Essentially, the courts usurp the policy-making role of the elected branches. 
A fear of judicial usurpation underlay much of the first wave (justiciability) debate in 
the social rights enforcement conversation. Usurpation was feared because it was assumed 
that judicial review had to take on a “strong form”, with courts, in enforcing social rights, 
overruling the decisions and actions of the elected branches. And this is problematic given 
courts’ limited legitimacy and capacity in this area. But it is now generally recognized that 
courts can enforce social rights without usurping the elected branches’ policy-making role. 
And so, scholarly contributions to the second wave debate have advocated weaker forms of 
judicial review.96 These weaker forms make it unnecessary for courts to make the “hapless 
choice” between usurpation and abdication; instead they may opt for a middle ground.97 
I suggest that a social rights enforcement framework based on the concept of political 
trust can similarly strike a good middle ground between these two wrongs. And it can do so 
because of the procedural orientation of trust (that is, as it has been conceptualized in the 
social science literature). Trust has commonly been conceptualized as a set of expectations 
held by the truster regarding the trustee’s behaviour.98 This set of expectations may be 
                                               
95 Young, supra note 92 134. See also Klatt, ibid at 361. 
96 For examples, see Dixon, supra note 11; Klein, supra note 12; Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: 
Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2008); Young, ibid. 
97 Klatt, supra note 94 at 361; Young, ibid at 34. See also King, supra note 8 at 8. 
98 Jack Barbalet, “A Characterization of Trust, and Its Consequences” (2009) 38 Theory and Society 367 at 371-
372; Barber, supra note 18 at 15-21; John Dunn, “Trust and Political Agency” in Diego Gambetta, ed, Trust: 
Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988) at 74; Farrell, supra note 18 at 
128-129; Karen Jones, “Trust as an Affective Attitude” (1996) 107 Ethics 4 at 5-6; Niklas Luhmann, 
“Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives” in Diego Gambetta, ed, Trust: Making and 
Breaking Cooperative Relations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988) at 97. 
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divided into three categories: (i) an expectation that the trustee will exercise good will 
towards the truster in exercising the control he maintains over the good or service at issue (an 
“expectation of good will”); (ii) an expectation that the trustee has the competence to fulfill 
his role – ie to exercise his control in a competent manner (an “expectation of competence”); 
and (iii) in fiduciary relationships, an expectation that the trustee will fulfill the fiduciary 
responsibility which he owes to the truster (an “expectation of fiduciary responsibility”).99 
 First is the truster’s expectation that the trustee will exercise good will towards her. 
This expectation has been characterized differently by different writers on trust.100 But I think 
that it may be summed up as an expectation that the trustee has good motives and that he will 
act in accordance with those good motives in exercising his control over the good or service. 
 The second expectation of which trust is comprised is an expectation held by the 
truster that the trustee has the technical competence (ie the knowledge and skills) to fulfill his 
                                               
99 This conceptualization of trust is cognitive in nature. However, there are also affective and behavioural 
components to trust (which this conceptualization does not cover). Moreover, as I elaborate later in the article, 
there is a competing conceptualization of trust in the literature which envisages trust as expectations held by the 
truster regarding the outcome of her interaction with the trustee: for example, see Diego Gambetta, “Can We 
Trust Trust?” in Diego Gambetta, ed, Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1988). For the reasons which I outline there, I do not accept this competing conceptualization.   
100 For example, Karen Jones has focused on how the trustee will respond to his being trusted, describing it as an 
“expectation that, when the need arises, the one trusted will be directly and favourably moved by the thought 
that you are counting on her”: Jones, supra note 98 at 5-6. For John Dunn, it is an “expectation of benign 
intentions in another free agent” thereby emphasizing a lack of ill will on the part of the trustee: Dunn, supra 
note 98 at 74. Bernard Barber’s account makes the expectation extremely broad, characterizing it as an 
“expectation of the persistence and fulfillment of the natural and the moral social orders” where those orders 
encompass an expectation that one will exercise good will towards another in the absence of reasons to the 
contrary: Barber, supra note 18 at 9. 
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role and thus, to exercise his control over the good or service.101 This expectation necessarily 
supplements the expectation of good will because as Karen Jones has justifiably pointed out, 
“optimism about goodwill is not sufficient, for some people have very good wills but very 
little competence, and the incompetent deserve our trust almost as little as the malicious”.102 
The trustee’s competence may come from a number of sources, including expert knowledge, 
technical facility or daily routine performance.103 Competence helps explain in part why trust 
involves a three-part relationship revolving around a good or service (X). Although we may 
expect that one has the competence to deal with one good or service, this expectation does 
not necessarily carry over to a different good or service. Where X changes, the truster’s 
expectations of the trustee’s competence may change and, in turn, the extent to which the 
truster trusts the trustee with respect to the new X in their relationship may also change. 
 In addition to the expectations of good will and competence which apply universally, 
in fiduciary relationships, trust is also comprised of a third expectation. This expectation 
finds its roots in the work of Bernard Barber. According to Barber, because there are cases 
where the truster may not be able to comprehend the trustee’s technical competence, society 
instills a moral sense of fiduciary responsibility in those who possess special knowledge and 
skills (and following from that, wield power).104 As he has pointed out, we can only monitor 
competent performance from these individuals and institutions “insofar as it is based on 
shared knowledge and expertise”.105 Where the trustee’s knowledge and expertise are not 
shared by the truster, something more is necessary. Fiduciary responsibility is that something 
more. Accordingly, trust by way of the fiduciary expectation is “a social mechanism that 
                                               
101 Barber, ibid at 9. 
102 Jones, supra note 98 at 6-7. 
103 Barber, supra note 18 at 9. 
104 ibid at 9. 
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makes possible the effective and just use of the power that knowledge and position give and 
forestalls abuses of that power”.106 The expectation is that the fiduciary will fulfill the 
responsibility which society has instilled in him. And that responsibility is, as Barber has put 
it, “to demonstrate a special concern for others’ interests above [the fiduciary’s] own”.107 
 A social rights enforcement framework based on political trust would, generally 
speaking, have the courts enforce the above three expectations in the citizen-government 
relationship. These expectations amount to, in the broadest of terms: (i) that the elected 
branches will exercise good will toward citizens in their exercise of control over social goods 
and services; (ii) that the elected branches have the requisite competence to exercise said 
control; and (iii) given my earlier argument that the citizen-government relationship is a 
fiduciary relationship, that the elected branches will fulfill their fiduciary responsibility to 
citizens in exercising said control. Such enforcement would involve two interrelated forms of 
judicial intervention in social rights cases. First, courts would use these three expectations to 
ex ante define the elected branches’ obligations to citizens in exercising their control over 
social goods and services. That is, courts would explicitly set out these obligations in their 
judgments (generally and as they play out in particular areas of social welfare) so that both 
the elected branches and citizens know what their obligations and entitlements, respectively, 
are. Second, courts would hold the elected branches accountable where they fail to fulfill 
those obligations. Put simply, the courts would be responsible for reviewing the elected 
branches’ social welfare legislation and executive action vis-à-vis social welfare. The criteria 
or standards against which that legislation and executive action are evaluated would be 
derived from the above three expectations of trust. And where the elected branches fail to 
comply with those three expectations, they would be censured and sanctioned by the courts. 
                                               
106 ibid at 15. 
107 ibid at 14. 
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Now, importantly, the three expectations described above regard the manner in which 
the trustee exercises his control over the good or service – in other words, the procedure by 
which that exercise of control takes place. They do not regard the outcome of the truster’s 
interaction with the trustee.108 Consequently, a political trust-based framework for enforcing 
social rights would have the courts principally reviewing the procedure by which the elected 
branches exercise their control over social goods and services (rather than the outcome of 
their decision-making).109 In other words, given trust’s procedural orientation, the courts, in 
applying a political trust-based framework, would not be defining the substance of social 
policy so as to usurp the elected branches’ policy-making role. However, the courts would be 
ensuring that the procedure followed by the elected branches in developing and implementing 
                                               
108 While there is a competing conceptualization of trust in the social science literature which focuses on the 
outcome of the truster’s interaction with the trustee, I do not accept that conceptualization. In support of my 
conclusion in this regard, see James G March and Johan P Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The 
Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1989) at 27; Oliver Williamson, “Calculativeness, 
Trust, and Economic Organization” (1993) 36 Journal of Law and Economics 453. Also, I do not accept an 
outcome-centred conceptualization of trust because empirical evidence has shown that citizens’ assessments of 
government legitimacy – and the cooperation which follows from it – are much more influenced by citizens’ 
judgments of the procedure by which government actors make decisions than by the outcome of their decision-
making: see John R Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy: Americans’ Beliefs About How 
Government Should Work (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Tom R Tyler and Peter Degoey, 
“Trust in Organizational Authorities: The Influence of Motive Attributions on Willingness to Accept Decisions” 
in Roderick M Kramer and Tom R Tyler, eds, Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research (New 
York: Sage Publications, 1996). Seeing as the principal basis for political trust’s value to contemporary 
democracies is citizen cooperation with government actors (and this, in turn, underlies my instrumental 
justification), I suggest that it is better to conceptualize trust in terms of the three expectations outlined here 
(which are procedural and whose connection with citizen cooperation finds strong empirical support). 
109 I say “principally” because, as I explain later, some elements of political trust (as I translate them in the 
specific context of social rights) are more substantive in nature. 
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social policy evinces good will, competence and fulfillment of its fiduciary responsibility to 
citizens. And in so doing, they could still, I suggest, play a meaningful role in social rights 
protection so as to not abdicate their constitutional role as protector and enforcer of rights.110 
Granted, procedural approaches to social rights enforcement have been the subject of 
much criticism. Such criticism has been, in large part, in response to the “reasonableness” 
approach adopted by the South African Constitutional Court in interpreting and applying its 
constitution’s social rights provisions (which scholars have interpreted as significantly 
procedural in nature).111 The principal concerns which have been raised by scholars in this 
camp are that procedural approaches (like reasonableness): (i) fail to set standards or lay 
                                               
110 In this regard, a political trust-based enforcement framework finds parallels in other procedural approaches to 
social rights enforcement: see Sandra Liebenberg, Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication Under a 
Transformative Constitution (Stellenbosch: Juta Law, 2010); Brian Ray, “Engagement’s Possibilities and Limits 
as a Socioeconomic Rights Remedy” (2010) 9 Washington Global Studies Law Review 399; Brian Ray, 
“Proceduralisation’s Triumph and Engagement’s Promise in Socio-Economic Rights Litigation” (2011) 27 
South African Journal on Human Rights 107; Brian Ray, Engaging with Social Rights: Procedure, 
Participation, and Democracy in South Africa’s Second Wave (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
111 David Bilchitz, “Giving Socio-Economic Rights Teeth: The Minimum Core and Its Importance” (2002) 119 
South African Law Journal 484; David Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and 
Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 136-176; Danie Brand, “The 
Proceduralisation of South African Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence, or ‘What are Socio-Economic Rights 
For?’” in Henk Botha, Andre van der Walt and Johan van der Walt, eds, Rights and Democracy in a 
Transformative Constitution (Stellenbosch: Sun Press, 2003); Marius Pieterse, “Resuscitating Socio-Economic 
Rights: Constitutional Entitlements to Health Care Services” (2006) 22 South African Journal on Human Rights 
473; Marius Pieterse, “Eating Socioeconomic Rights: The Usefulness of Rights Talk in Alleviating Social 
Hardship Revisited” (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 796. There have also been more recent criticisms aimed 
at the “proceduralisation” of social rights in terms of the Court’s adoption of engagement as an enforcement tool 
in social rights cases: for example, see Kirsty McLean, “Meaningful Engagement: One Step Forward or Two 
Back? Some Thoughts on Joe Slovo” (2010) 3 Constitutional Court Review 223. 
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down principles which can guide future policy-making (as well as aid courts in future social 
rights cases); and (ii) they have limited practical effect in that they do little to protect 
vulnerable groups (and following from this, they may discourage litigation). These concerns 
are valid. However, I think that a political trust-based framework for enforcing social rights, 
while principally procedural, would mitigate these two concerns to a significant degree. 
On the first concern, we know that a political trust-based framework would have 
courts use trust’s three expectations to ex ante define the elected branches’ obligations to 
citizens. Consequently, unlike many procedural approaches (including reasonableness), it 
would set standards and lay down principles, both to guide future policy-making and for 
courts in future cases: those standards and principles stemming from the expectations of trust. 
Further, I submit that such a framework would mitigate the concern of procedural 
approaches having limited practical effect. Why? By using trust’s expectations to ex ante 
define the elected branches’ obligations, courts would promote what Brian Ray has termed 
the “institutionalisation” of procedural remedies. In his work, Ray has argued that 
engagement (a procedural remedy introduced by the Constitutional Court which obliges 
governments to engage meaningfully with affected communities on social welfare matters) 
“can give poor people and their advocates an important enforcement tool”.112 But to do so, 
engagement must be institutionalized. For Ray, institutionalization requires governments to 
adopt measures which “ensure systematic implementation of engagement” such that they 
“work to develop a more generalised capacity for engagement outside of specific projects”.113 
In parallel to Ray’s argument vis-à-vis engagement, I suggest that the expectations of 
trust – if institutionalized in the elected branches’ exercise of control over social goods and 
services – could do a lot to protect vulnerable groups. That protection will become clearer 
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shortly once I conceptualize political trust in the social rights context. But generally, they 
would promote government good will, competence and fulfillment of fiduciary responsibility. 
And a political trust-based framework would encourage the institutionalization of these 
expectations because, again, courts would use them to ex ante define the elected branches’ 
obligations. Put simply, the expectations would not only serve as an accountability measure 
(used by courts on an ad hoc basis to review resource allocation decisions), but the elected 
branches would be expected to develop and implement social policy broadly in compliance 
with those expectations (with failure to comply giving rise to court intervention). A political 
trust-based framework would thus promote those expectations’ “systematic implementation” 
in the elected branches’ overall exercise of control over social goods and services. 
III. Conceptualizing Political Trust in the Social Rights Context 
Having justified in Part II why political trust offers a promising basis for a social 
rights enforcement framework, I will now use this final part of the article to explain in further 
detail what it means for citizens to “trust” the elected branches with respect to social rights. 
In other words, I will elaborate upon what the three expectations of trust translate into in the 
specific context of social rights. This elaboration is necessary because, as scholars generally 
agree, trust is a context-specific concept.114 Put simply, what trust means in one context may 
not necessarily hold in another. Importantly, my elaboration here will provide us with some 
insight into what a political trust-based framework for enforcing social rights would entail. 
A. The Expectation of Good Will 
I contend that in the citizen-government relationship, the first constituent expectation 
of trust – that of good will – translates into a pair of inter-related sub-expectations. 
                                               
114 Barber, supra note 18 at 16-17; Gambetta, supra note 99 at 219; Holton, supra note 17 at 67; Hardin, supra 
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 The first sub-expectation is that those who staff the elected branches will not act in 
bad faith.115 What does bad faith in the social rights context denote? Kent Roach and Geoff 
Budlender have outlined a typology of three reasons for why governments fail to comply 
with social rights.116 The first is inattentiveness and refers to those circumstances in which 
government actors make unintentional oversights or, as is more commonly the case, they fail 
to appreciate the nature of their constitutional obligations.117 The second, incompetence, 
captures those cases of government non-compliance which are due to incapacity or, in the 
words of Roach and Budlender, the product of “decades of neglect, inadequate budgets and 
inadequate training of public officials”.118 And finally, and of note here, there is intransigence 
which covers those situations in which government actors understand their constitutional 
obligations and have the capacity to meet them, yet they refuse to do so.119 In my view, the 
first sub-expectation of good will is captured by Roach and Budlender’s intransigence 
concept. It is an expectation that the elected branches will not act “intransigently” in 
exercising their control over social goods and services. Where the elected branches (or more 
accurately their staff) understand their obligations to citizens and are able to meet those 
obligations – but they choose not to – the elected branches exercise their control in bad faith. 
The second sub-expectation which I suggest is encompassed by good will is that the 
elected branches, in exercising their control over social goods and services, will employ fair 
                                               
115 In support of this conclusion, see Dunn, supra note 98 at 74, 89-90. 
116 Kent Roach and Geoff Budlender, “Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When is it Appropriate, 
Just and Equitable?” (2005) 5 South African Law Journal 325. Roach and Budlender’s typology was adapted 
from a typology set out in the following work: Chris Hansen, “Inattentive, Intransigent and Incompetent” in RS 
Humm and others, eds, Child, Parent and State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994). 
117 Roach and Budlender, ibid at 346. 
118 Roach and Budlender conceptualize incompetence in a slightly different way than I do. 
119 Aoife Nolan, Children’s Socio-Economic Rights, Democracy and the Courts (Oxford: Hart, 2014) at 210. 
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procedures. This sub-expectation follows from the first. To use Joel Brockner and Phyllis 
Siegel’s words, “The fairness of procedures says a lot about whether the [trustee’s] ‘heart is 
in the right place.’ Fair procedures signify that the [trustee] ‘means well,’ that is, [he] appears 
to want to live up to [his] commitments”.120 Now, given the breadth of “fair procedures”, it is 
beyond the scope of this article to offer a comprehensive definition of the notion in the social 
rights context. That said, I would like to provide at least some minimal elaboration of it here. 
In debating the parameters of procedural fairness, scholars have identified a lengthy 
list of elements which they say (often supported by empirical evidence) contribute to people’s 
assessments of procedural fairness.121 Undoubtedly, these elements carry different weight 
depending on context.122 Thus, in what follows, I will outline three elements from this 
literature which I regard as carrying particular weight in the social rights context. But first, a 
point of clarification. Since I have conceptualized political trust as a set of expectations held 
by citizens, it seems reasonable that the fairness of procedures would also be judged from 
citizens’ perspective. In other words, fairness is defined by what citizens would reasonably be 
expected to consider fair. With that clarification made, I turn to the three fairness elements. 
                                               
120 Joel Brockner and Phyllis Siegel, “Understanding the Interaction Between Procedural and Distributive 
Justice: The Role of Trust” in Roderick M Kramer and Tom R Tyler, eds, Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of 
Theory and Research (New York: Sage Publications, 1996) at 407. 
121 As a representative sample, see Gerald S Leventhal, “What Should be Done with Equity Theory? New 
Approaches to the Study of Fairness in Social Relationships” in Kenneth J Gergen, Martin S Greenberg and 
Richard H Willis, eds, Social Exchange: Advances in Theory and Research (New York: Plenus Press, 1980); 
Tom R Tyler, “What is Procedural Justice? Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal 
Procedures” (1988) 103 Law and Society Review 103; Tom R Tyler, “Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure” 
(2000) 35 International Journal of Psychology 117. 
122 Leventhal, ibid at 39. 
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The first element which I submit carries particular weight in the social rights context 
is transparency: for citizens to perceive the process by which the elected branches exercise 
their control over social goods and services as fair, it must be transparent.123 A transparent 
process enables citizens to see how the elected branches are exercising their control over 
social goods and services and to know whether, in that process, the actors who staff those 
branches are indeed acting with good will (not to mention acting in accordance with the other 
two expectations of trust). Linking transparency directly to citizen trust, Karen Cook, Russell 
Hardin and Margaret Levi have noted that because “[p]ower is often correlated with lack of 
transparency and secrecy”, those in political power are more likely to be perceived as 
trustworthy if they employ “a decisionmaking process that is transparent enough to those 
dependent on them to reveal that their actions are in the best interest of those over whom they 
have power”.124  In the social rights context, such transparency is especially important 
because, as one commentator has put it, the “welfare state presents itself to the public as an 
extraordinar[ily] complex, diversified and unintelligible institutional arrangement”.125  A 
                                               
123 Margaret Levi, Audrey Sacks and Tom Tyler, “Conceptualizing Legitimacy, Measuring Legitimating 
Beliefs” (2009) 53 American Behavioral Scientist 354 at 360; Tom R Tyler, “Procedural Justice and the Rule of 
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Law, Medicine and Ethics 669; Donna Greschner and Steven Lewis, “Auton and Evidence-Based Decision-
Making: Medicare in the Courts” (2003) 82 The Canadian Bar Review 501; Martha Jackman, “Charter Review 
as a Health Care Accountability Mechanism in Canada” (2010) 18 Health Law Journal 1. 
124 Cook, Hardin and Levi, supra note 56 at 56-57. See also Claus Offe, “How Can We Trust Our Fellow 
Citizens?” in Mark E Warren, ed, Democracy and Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) at 54. 
125 Karl Hinrichs, “Social Insurances and the Culture of Solidarity: The Moral Infrastructure of Interpersonal 
Redistributions – with Special Reference to the German Health Care System” (Centre for Social Policy 
 
38 
transparent process signals to citizens that the elected branches have nothing to hide in this 
arrangement. In essence, transparency offers citizens good reason to expect good will to be 
exercised by the elected branches (as well as, again, the other two expectations of trust). This 
is because if the elected branches fail to meet citizens’ expectations, their failure will be on 
display for everyone to see.126 Moreover, and relatedly, if a citizen wishes to challenge a 
governmental resource allocation decision, a transparent process equips that citizen with the 
information she needs to do so and, in turn, to hold the elected branches accountable.127 
The second element of procedural fairness which I say is of considerable importance 
in the social rights context is participation: for citizens to judge the elected branches’ process 
for exercising their control over social goods and services as fair, it must be participatory.128 
To use the concise words of Margaret Levi: “If a group perceives that its voice is 
systematically ignored, it will not accept the policy-making process as fair”.129 Importantly, 
Tom Tyler has found that while people feel more fairly treated if they are given opportunities 
“to participate in the resolution of their problems or conflicts by presenting their suggestions 
about what should be done”, such participation need not amount to control over outcome.130 
People value the simple opportunity to share their views with decision-makers even if those 
                                                                                                                                                  
Research, University of Bremen, 1997), cited in Trüdinger and Bollow, supra note 39 at 191. See also 
O’Cinneide, supra note 8 at 404-405. 
126 For Pierre Rosanvallon, transparency has “replace[d] the exercise of responsibility as the end of politics”: 
Counter-Democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 258-259. 
127 Warren, “Democratic Theory and Trust”, supra note 61 at 338. 
128 Leventhal, supra note 122 at 44; Tyler (2000), supra note 122 at 121-122. In addition, scholars have 
emphasized the importance of participation in the social rights context: Fredman, supra note 5; Oliver 
Gerstenberg, “Negative/Positive Constitutionalism, ‘Fair Balance,’ and the Problem of Justiciability” (2012) 10 
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129 Levi, supra note 37 at 23-24. 
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views have little to no influence on the decisions made.131 In fact, when it comes to political 
disputes, Tyler has found that not only do people not need control over outcomes, they do not 
want it: people expect government authorities to make those decisions for them.132 However, 
people do need to feel that their views were sincerely considered by decision-makers – that 
is, that their “voice” was heard by the relevant decision-makers.133 To quote Tyler, for 
participation to lead to “the evaluation of procedures as fairer”, people “must trust that the 
authority sincerely considered their argument, even if they were then rejected”.134 
Accordingly, I suggest that for citizens to perceive the process by which the elected 
branches exercise their control over social goods and services as fair, citizens must be able to 
participate in that process. If a governmental decision in exercise of such control has 
particular impact on a specific group of citizens, procedural fairness requires that said group 
be able to express its views to the relevant government authority and that the latter, in turn, 
sincerely consider those views in making its decision. The government authority need not 
allow those views to dictate its ultimate decision; but it must sincerely consider the views. 
The final element of procedural fairness which I will point to as especially important 
in the social rights context is respect for citizens’ rights: for citizens to perceive the process 
by which the elected branches exercise their control over social goods and services as fair, 
their rights must be respected in that process.135 For Tyler, this element falls under a larger 
fairness element which he has called “treatment with dignity and respect”.136 He has found 
that people judge a procedure as fairer when they are treated with dignity and respect – and 
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such treatment includes both “common respect and courtesy” as well as “respect for peoples’ 
rights”.137 In Tyler’s words, “People value having respect shown for their rights and for their 
status within society. They are very concerned that, in the process of dealing with authorities, 
their dignity as people and as members of society is recognized and acknowledged”.138 
Now, as Tyler has pointed out, respect for citizens’ rights encompasses both human 
rights as well as legal process rights (eg standing to bring a legal case).139 And therefore, 
procedural fairness requires that the elected branches respect all of these rights in exercising 
their control over social goods and services. That said, I would like to stress one particular 
right here: citizens’ (human) right to equality.140 Why? As many scholars have emphasized, 
the right to equality is closely related to social rights.141 And following from this relationship, 
we should – in addressing the enforcement of social rights – also consider equality. 
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Accordingly, this brings me to a question: if procedural fairness in the social rights context 
requires that the elected branches respect citizens’ rights – including, importantly, their right 
to equality – what does it mean for the elected branches to respect citizens’ right to equality? 
Under a formal approach to equality, it means that the elected branches will, in 
exercising their control over social goods and services, treat all citizens alike. But the 
equality literature makes very clear that the formal approach suffers from several problems, 
including, of note, its perverse capability of disallowing governmental measures aimed at 
actually promoting equality.142 For that reason, I submit that respect for citizens’ right to 
equality cannot reasonably connote protection of formal equality. Rather, in line with what is 
the overwhelmingly dominant view in the literature (as well as the position adopted by some 
courts), I submit that equality in this regard means substantive equality.143 And consequently, 
for the elected branches to respect citizens’ right to equality in their exercise of control over 
social goods and services, they must exercise it in furtherance of substantive equality. 
Unlike formal equality (which focuses on differential treatment in law, seeking to 
eliminate such differential treatment), substantive equality’s focus is on “patterns of group-
based disadvantage” which give rise to structural inequality.144 It recognizes that “equality 
cannot be achieved by adopting a merely negative or ‘hands-off’ approach”; and hence, it 
acknowledges the need for positive governmental measures which address that group’s 
disadvantaged position.145 In view of that, substantive equality is said to “transcend[] formal 
equality at the point where it demands differential legal treatment in order to ameliorate and 
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overcome inequalities”.146 While there is much agreement in the equality literature in favour 
of a substantive (rather than formal) approach to equality, there is disagreement as to the 
overarching objectives of such an approach: that is, they agree that equality demands positive 
governmental measures but disagree over what is to be equalized in introducing such positive 
measures.147 Sandra Fredman, in her influential work in the area, has argued that substantive 
equality “resists capture by a single principle”.148 According to her, substantive equality is, 
rather, a multi-dimensional concept.149 And drawing on the strengths of various principles in 
the substantive equality discourse, Fredman has identified four objectives for the concept: (i) 
to promote respect for the equal dignity and worth of all (including to redress stigma, 
stereotyping, humiliation and violence); (ii) to accommodate, affirm and celebrate identity 
within a community; (iii) to break the cycle of disadvantage which is associated with out-
group membership; and (iv) to facilitate full participation in society.150 For Fredman, these 
objectives – or dimensions – interact and have synergies with one another; and therefore, we 
can, and we should, consider how the dimensions might be used to buttress one another. 
I agree with Fredman’s conceptualization. It recognizes the complexity of inequality, 
locating the right to equality, as Fredman has noted, in its “social context, responsive to those 
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who are disadvantaged, demeaned, excluded, or ignored”.151 Hence, adopting this multi-
dimensional conceptualization of substantive equality for the purpose of conceptualizing trust 
in the citizen-government relationship, I contend that for the elected branches to exercise 
their control over social goods and services in furtherance of substantive equality, they must 
strive to implement measures which achieve the above objectives. And given the procedural 
fairness requirement that citizens’ rights (including equality) be respected, the elected 
branches must so strive for the process by which they exercise control to be judged as fair.152 
Now, granted, because I am adopting a substantive conception of equality, a political 
trust-based framework for enforcing social rights cannot be fairly described as entirely 
procedural.153 And therefore, this element of procedural fairness presents some complications 
for the framework (specifically for my earlier argument that the framework is capable of 
striking a good middle ground between the two wrongs of enforcement owing to trust’s 
procedural orientation). But this more substantive element, I suggest, does not preclude a 
political trust-based framework from nonetheless striking a good middle ground between the 
two wrongs of enforcement. On this point, a distinction can – and should – be drawn 
between, on the one hand, what equality signifies and, on the other, how courts should 
enforce the right to equality.154 Human rights have roles and functions beyond the courts.155 
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Recognizing this distinction, Fredman (despite advocating the above-outlined 
substantive conception of equality) has suggested that courts, given their limitations, should 
occupy a catalytic (rather than prescriptive) role in enforcing the right to equality. As she has 
emphasized, “the existence of a right does not mean that the court needs to make primary 
decisions about the allocation of resources”.156 According to her, courts – rather than detract 
from democracy (which would be the case if they made primary decisions about resource 
allocation) – can and should enhance democracy by requiring decision-makers to justify, in 
light of the equality principle, their decisions. Simply, they should require decision-makers to 
“show that their choice of eligibility criteria” satisfies the four objectives of substantive 
equality such that their choice “not only redresses disadvantage, but also promotes respect 
and dignity, accommodates diverse identities, and facilitates participation or counters social 
exclusion”.157 I agree with Fredman’s view on the role of courts in enforcing the right to 
equality. Not only does it recognize the complexity of inequality, but it acknowledges the 
limited legitimacy and capacity of courts in making resource allocation decisions. As such, it 
neither strips equality of substance (in a way that a formal conception of equality would) nor 
yields judicial usurpation of the elected branches’ policy-making role. So, if we incorporate 
Fredman’s approach into the otherwise procedural trust-based framework for enforcing social 
rights (as I think we can and we should), the resultant framework – though not entirely 
procedural – could still strike a good middle ground between the two wrongs of enforcement. 
To sum up, I have suggested that in the citizen-government relationship, the good will 
expectation translates into two sub-expectations: one is that those who staff the elected 
                                                                                                                                                  
executive decision-making so that legislation, policy, and administration are formulated to meet human rights 
demands”: Fredman, ibid at 32-33. 
156 ibid at 182. 
157 ibid at 182. 
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branches will not act in bad faith toward citizens (ie will not act intransigently), and the other 
is that the elected branches will use fair procedures in exercising their control over social 
goods and services (including those which are transparent, participative and respectful of 
citizens’ rights (including equality)). So, to say that citizens “trust” the elected branches with 
respect to social rights means, at least in part, that they expect such actions and procedures. 
B. The Expectation of Fiduciary Responsibility 
In the citizen-government relationship, the expectation of fiduciary responsibility is 
closely connected with the expectation of good will. For this reason, I will consider it next. 
If we accept that the citizen-government relationship is indeed fiduciary in nature (as I 
argued in Part II), and following from this, that the expectation of fiduciary responsibility 
does apply to the relationship, this leaves the question: what precisely does the expectation of 
fiduciary responsibility involve?158  To repeat, this expectation is closely related to the 
expectation of good will. Both involve, broadly speaking, an expectation that the elected 
branches will act in citizens’ interests; however, the expectation of fiduciary responsibility 
takes it a step further. At its core, it is an expectation that the elected branches, in exercising 
their control over social goods and services, will not allow their staff’s interests to impact 
their decisions (thereby unfairly discounting or disregarding citizens’ or a subset of citizens’ 
interests). Fiduciary relationships are said to give rise to a number of duties or obligations on 
the part of the fiduciary: these include loyalty, care, and in the public law context, fairness 
and reasonableness.159 The expectation of fiduciary responsibility is an expectation that these 
                                               
158 The conclusion that the expectation of fiduciary responsibility applies to the citizen-government relationship 
also finds support in Barber’s work. Barber has specifically recognized the application of this expectation to the 
relationship between the public and its leaders: Barber, supra note 18 at 80-81. Thus, it is reasonable to think 
that Barber himself would have found that the expectation of fiduciary responsibility applies here. 
159 Fox-Decent (2011), supra note 63 at 34-37. 
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duties will be fulfilled. Again, it is beyond the scope of this article to offer an exhaustive 
analysis of each of these duties and to define precisely what they entail in the social rights 
context. However, as Fox-Decent has suggested, “the most fundamental and general fiduciary 
duty” (by which many of these duties are encompassed) is what he has described as “fidelity 
to the other-regarding purposes for which fiduciary power is held”.160 As I noted earlier, on 
the basis of the beneficiary’s trust, the fiduciary is granted the power to act on the 
beneficiary’s behalf: that is, to pursue her interests. Hence, the fiduciary’s responsibility is to 
exercise said power for that specific purpose: he must pursue only the beneficiary’s interests. 
In applying this duty to the citizen-government relationship, there are two issues 
which a reader may reasonably raise. The first relates to the identity of the beneficiary. In a 
political relationship, like the citizen-government relationship, the fiduciary has multiple 
beneficiaries (ie all citizens) whose interests are bound to conflict with one another (at least 
in some cases).161 Thus, the fiduciary does not have one beneficiary whose singular set of 
interests he may pursue; accordingly, in fulfilling his duty, he is obliged to pursue multiple, 
competing interests which he must necessarily balance. However, as Fox-Decent has said, 
“there is nothing intrinsically wrong or unusual with office-holders having distinct and even 
conflicting duties to different classes of individuals”.162 It introduces complications for sure; 
but those complications are not insuperable.163 That said, the core fiduciary duty – fidelity to 
the other-regarding purposes of the fiduciary’s power – demands that while the fiduciary 
                                               
160 ibid at 37. See also Fox-Decent (2005), supra note 63 at 268. 
161 Fox-Decent (2011), ibid at 34. 
162 Fox-Decent, supra note 64 at 387. 
163 Fox-Decent has noted in this regard, “The issue of how fiduciaries should reconcile competing mandates is 
undertheorized and likely to prove challenging. But the fact that there are concrete examples of fiduciaries who 
balance multiple charges on an ongoing basis suggests that close attention to practice should prove rewarding, 
and that the challenge is not insuperable”: ibid at 387. 
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pursues these multiple, competing interests, he does not allow his own interests to interfere 
with the beneficiaries’ interests.164 This brings me to the second issue: do the elected 
branches, as fiduciaries of citizens, have “interests”? I would say not per se; however, those 
actors who staff the elected branches definitely do, which may conflict with citizens’ (or a 
subset of citizens’) interests and which may be furthered at their expense. These actors’ core 
fiduciary duty, as staff of the elected branches, is to ensure that the latter does not happen.165 
 I thus suggest that in the citizen-government relationship, the fiduciary responsibility 
expectation both rightfully applies and it amounts, at its core, to an expectation that the 
elected branches will exercise their control over social goods and services for “other-
regarding purposes” – that is, the elected branches will pursue only the interests of citizens 
and not the interests of their staff. Hence, to say that citizens “trust” the elected branches with 
respect to social rights means, again in part, that the elected branches will act in this way. 
C. The Expectation of Competence 
Last but certainly not least, trust in the citizen-government relationship entails an 
expectation of competence. In the citizen-government relationship, this expectation may be 
described, broadly speaking, as an expectation that the elected branches have the requisite 
competence to exercise their control over social goods and services and so, in turn, that they 
will exercise said control in a competent manner. But what exactly does that mean? In other 
words, what defines “competence” from the elected branches? How do they exercise their 
control over social goods and services in a “competent” manner? I suggest that in the citizen-
government relationship, competence engages the idea of evidence-based policy-making 
(EBPM). In brief, it is my suggestion that the expectation of competence in the citizen-
                                               
164 Fox-Decent (2005), supra note 63 at 280. See also Leib, Ponet and Serota, supra note 63 at 712-713. 
165 For further support of this conclusion, see Evan Fox-Decent and Evan J Criddle, “The Fiduciary Constitution 
of Human Rights” (2009) 15 Legal Theory 301 at 318. 
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government relationship translates into an expectation that the elected branches will exercise 
their control over social goods and services in accordance with the principles of EBPM. 
 EBPM is a model aimed at the development and implementation of the most effective 
public policies and programs. It revolves around three forms of knowledge.166 The first, and 
perhaps the most commonly associated with EBPM, is knowledge derived from scientific 
research. Under EBPM, policy-makers use the best available research from the natural and 
social sciences in order to better understand and improve public policies and programs. 
However, as scholars have emphasized, under EBPM, scientific research is not, or at least 
should not be, determinative: in J.A. Muir Gray’s words, with EBPM, “decisions are based 
on evidence and not made by evidence”.167 Therefore, EBPM necessitates a synthesis of 
knowledge from scientific research with other forms of knowledge.168 Brian Head has 
usefully categorized these other forms of knowledge into what he has called “political 
knowledge” and “practical implementation knowledge”. “Political knowledge” – a form of 
knowledge which comes into play during the development stage for public policies and 
programs – refers to the “know-how, analysis and judgment of political actors”.169 It is a vast 
and varied form of knowledge indeed, including everything from persuasion and advocacy 
skills as well as the ability to build coalitions of support, to the capacity to negotiate trade-
offs and compromises. “Practical implementation knowledge” – which instead comes into 
play during the public policy and program implementation stage – is knowledge relating to 
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the management of social programs. It encapsulates what one needs to know in order to 
“wrestle with everyday problems of program implementation and client service”. 170 
Stemming from “the ‘practical wisdom’ of professionals in their ‘communities of practice’”, 
this form of knowledge assumes the form of government actors adopting a “best practice”.171 
 I suggest that these three forms of knowledge are what citizens would reasonably 
expect from “competent” government in its exercise of control over social goods and 
services. For political actors (members of the legislature, Cabinet members), it is reasonable 
that “political knowledge” would be expected of such actors to be deemed competent in 
carrying out their responsibilities with respect social goods and services (ie preparing, 
developing and promulgating primary legislation, as well as preparing and approving the 
budget). And by the same token, “practical implementation knowledge” would be reasonably 
expected of administrative decision-makers in competently carrying out their responsibilities 
in implementing social programs. Moreover, it is also reasonable that a competent 
government would be expected to possess the kind of knowledge from scientific research 
which EBPM demands. In exercising their control over social goods and services, the elected 
branches make decisions – including which social goods and services to fund and deliver, 
how much money to invest in a social program, and who will and will not be covered by that 
program – in order to serve certain policy ends. Scientific research, by offering insights into 
which policy initiatives are the most effective to achieve those ends, is therefore of critical 
value. Accordingly, I submit that competent decisions in this regard should be made on the 
basis of the best research available. Further, this suggestion follows from my earlier 
discussion of competence. As I explained there, a trustee’s competence may come from a 
number of sources, including expert knowledge. Now, granted, the elected branches’ staff 
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cannot be experts in all fields and sub-fields of social welfare. But surely it is reasonable that 
where a trustee does not possess the requisite knowledge and skills himself (as the elected 
branches may not), competence demands that he make good faith efforts to seek out those 
who do. In such cases, the source of the trustee’s competence is, rather than his own 
knowledge and skills, those of another actor (and the research which that actor produces); and 
so, whether the trustee is indeed “competent” will depend on the competence of the actor 
upon whom he relies. Hence, to be truly competent, the trustee must make good faith efforts 
to seek out the most competent actor and so, the best available evidence from research. 
 In sum, the last expectation comprising trust in the citizen-government relationship is 
an expectation that the elected branches will exercise their control over social goods and 
services in a competent manner. I suggest that this expectation translates into an expectation 
that the elected branches will exercise said control in accordance with the principles of 
EBPM: that is, they (or more accurately their staff) will exhibit what Head has called 
“political knowledge” and “practical implementation knowledge”, and they will base their 
decisions on the best available evidence from research. Therefore, the final part to saying that 
citizens “trust” the elected branches with respect to social rights is that they expect them to 
use the foregoing EBPM principles in exercising their control over social goods and services. 
D. What Would a Political Trust-Based Enforcement Framework Look Like? 
So, what would a social rights enforcement framework based on political trust look 
like? As I explained earlier, it would, generally speaking, have the courts enforce the three 
expectations of trust, using those expectations to ex ante define the elected branches’ 
obligations to citizens in exercising their control over social goods and services, and holding 
the elected branches accountable for their failure to fulfill those obligations. Using the three 
expectations as translated here for the specific context of social rights, the elected branches’ 
obligations would be, in broad terms: (i) to not behave intransigently and to employ fair 
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procedures, including those which are transparent, participatory and respectful of citizens’ 
right to equality; (ii) to ensure that their staff’s interests do not sway their decisions, so as to 
unfairly discount or disregard citizens’ or a subset of citizens’ interests; and (iii) to develop 
and implement their social policies and programs in accordance with the principles of EBPM. 
Conclusion 
My aim in this article has been to introduce a new concept – that of political trust – to 
the contentious and longstanding social rights enforcement conversation. While a great deal 
has been written on this conversation, I think that political trust, an unexplored area in the 
field, is a necessary addition. Hence, much like my contemporaries in other fields of law have 
argued in their respective scholarship, I have suggested that we have much to gain by 
considering political trust. Specifically, I have sought to make out the claim that political 
trust offers a promising basis for a social rights enforcement framework; and this is so for the 
instrumental, theoretical and practical justifications which I have set out in this article. 
Granted, much work remains to be done in this area. Further work must be performed to fully 
develop such a framework, including translating political trust’s three expectations into 
judicially enforceable obligations on governments. For this reason, I have not endeavoured to 
apply the three expectations to social rights jurisprudence. Such analysis is, I think, best left 
for another day when the framework is more fully developed. That said, my discussion in this 
article, by justifying political trust’s use as the basis for such a framework and taking steps to 
conceptualize it in this context, provides a solid footing upon which that work can be built. 
